Modern password hashing remains a critical defense against credential
cracking, yet the transition from theoretically secure algorithms to robust
real-world implementations remains fraught with challenges. This paper presents
a dual analysis of Argon2, the Password Hashing Competition winner, combining
attack simulations quantifying how parameter configurations impact guessing
costs under realistic budgets, with the first large-scale empirical study of
Argon2 adoption across public GitHub software repositories. Our economic model,
validated against cryptocurrency mining benchmarks, demonstrates that OWASP’s
recommended 46 MiB configuration reduces compromise rates by 42.5% compared to
SHA-256 at \$1/account attack budgets for strong user passwords. However,
memory-hardness exhibits diminishing returns as increasing allocations to RFC
9106’s 2048 MiB provides just 23.3% (\$1) and 17.7% (\$20) additional
protection despite 44.5 times greater memory demands. Crucially, both
configurations fail to mitigate risks from weak passwords, with 96.9-99.8%
compromise rates for RockYou-like credentials regardless of algorithm choice.
Our repository analysis shows accelerating Argon2 adoption, yet weak
configuration practices: 46.6% of deployments use weaker-than-OWASP parameters.
Surprisingly, sensitive applications (password managers, encryption tools) show
no stronger configurations than general software. Our findings highlight that a
secure algorithm alone cannot ensure security, effective parameter guidance and
developer education remain essential for realizing Argon2’s theoretical
advantages.

Este artículo explora los viajes en el tiempo y sus implicaciones.

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